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Abstract—The Domain Name System (DNS) provides a trans-
lation between readable domain names and IP addresses. The
DNS is a key infrastructure component of the Internet and a
prime target for a variety of attacks. One of the most significant
threat to the DNS’s wellbeing is a DNS poisoning attack, in which
the DNS responses are maliciously replaced, or poisoned, by an
attacker. To identify this kind of attack, we start by an analysis
of different kinds of response times. We present an analysis of
typical and atypical response times, while differentiating between
the different levels of DNS servers’ response times, from root
servers down to internal caching servers. We successfully identify
empirical DNS poisoning attacks based on a novel method for
DNS response timing analysis. We then present a system we
developed to validate our technique that does not require any
changes to the DNS protocol or any existing network equipment.
Our validation system tested data from different architectures
including LAN and cloud environments and real data from
an Internet Service Provider (ISP). Our method and system
differ from most other DNS poisoning detection methods and
achieved high detection rates exceeding 99%. These findings
suggest that when used in conjunction with other methods, they
can considerably enhance the accuracy of these methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS) [1], [2] is one of the best
known protocols in the Internet. Its main function is to trans-
late human-readable domain names into their corresponding
IP addresses. Its importance for the Internet is derived from
the fact that virtually all day-to-day network applications use
DNS. The translation process is done through DNS queries
between the client and the DNS server (resolver). The ordering
of the DNS tree, from the root down, is called the ”DNS
Hierarchy” and is depicted in Fig. 1.
There are two types of DNS resolvers, termed Authoritative
and Recursive. Authoritative name servers give answers in
response to queries about IP addresses. They only respond to
queries about domains that have been configured to provide
answers. Recursive resolvers provide the proper IP address
requested by the client. They do the translation process by
themselves, and return the final response to the client. In this
paper, we focus on recursive DNS resolvers.
Generally, clients issue their queries using DNS messages
to a DNS resolver which maps each query to a matching
Resource Record (RR) set and returns it in the response DNS
message. Each record is associated with a Time-To-Live (TTL)
value. Resolvers are allowed to store (cache) the response in
their memory until the TTL value expires. When this time
period has elapsed, the RR is evicted from the cache.
Given a query to resolve, a recursive resolver looks up the
cache for a matching record. If one exists, it is returned as
the response. If not, the recursor uses the DNS resolution
process to obtain a matching record by implementing the
Fig. 1. DNS hierarchy example
following steps. First, it determines the closest zone (level in
the hierarchy) that encloses the query and has its information
cached. If no such zone is cached, the enclosing zone is
the root zone. In this case, the recursive resolver resorts to
contacting the DNS root-servers. The root server it contacts
returns an authoritative response, which redirects the recursive
resolver to a Top Level Domain (TLD) server. Then, the
recursor requests a response from the TLD server. The TLD
server sends the full resolution response, or a redirection to a
Second Level Domain (SLD) server. A process similar to the
one for the TLD is carried out by the SLD server, and the
DNS hierarchy levels beneath it (in the DNS hierarchy tree).
Various studies have examined DNS attacks [3]–[9] de-
signed to prevent clients from resolving RRs. One of the
most common attacks is DNS cache poisoning, where the
attacker provides spoofed records in the responses to redirect
the victims to malicious hosts. This kind of attack can facilitate
credentials theft, malware distribution, censorship and others.
Over the years, a number of improvements have been sug-
gested to secure the DNS. One of the main advances is known
as Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
[10]–[12]. It consists of a set of extensions to the DNS which
provides DNS resolvers with origin authentication of DNS
data, authenticated denial of existence, and data integrity. All
responses that use DNSSEC are digitally signed. By checking
the digital signature, a DNS resolver is able to verify whether
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the information is identical (i.e. unmodified and complete) to
the information published by the zone’s owner and served on
an authoritative DNS server. In so doing, DNSSEC protects
against cache poisoning [13].
DNSSEC appears to be efficient, but it does not guarantee
availability or confidentiality. Its deployment rate is less than
20% of all name servers globally, as updated monthly in the
Internet society’s statistics [14]. In addition, many DNSSEC
keys are vulnerable [15]. Thus shielding from cache poisoning
remains a crucial unresolved issue, as described in [16].
Contribution of This Work: Our hypothesis, as shown in
Fig. 2, is that the time elapsed from the DNS query to the
relevant DNS response is best fit by a group of Poisson
distributions. A Poisson distribution is a statistical distribution
of the likelihood an event will occur within a time interval. The
average number of events in an interval is designated by λ. A
Poisson distribution is a typical decision in the field of network
attacks [17]. In this paper, each Poisson resembles a level in
the DNS resolution process. We posited that the gaps between
the Poissons could indicate anomalies. Thus anomalies point
to attacks with high probability.
To test this assumption, we chose a sample of Alexa’s top
sites [18]. We acquired data from simulations and from a real
ISP. We inspected the distribution of the entire domains’ data
and each domain separately. Some of the cases we examined
exhibited a distribution similar to our assumption. We created
attack data, based on a third party attack tool. We constructed
a detection system for the attacks based on the simulation data.
Our key contribution is the innovative notion that attack
detection can be based solely on time value. This simple
concept is also efficient in terms of running time and memory.
Our simulations ran at different times, and on different network
parameters, environments etc. Therefore, our data includes
jitter and packet loss. In our analysis we do not mention this
noise explicitly. Furthermore, the levels detection in Section
IV-C is compared to a real data from an ISP. The other novel
insights we present here are as follows:
• Timing analysis of DNS authoritative servers - We mea-
sured the response times of the root and TLD levels.
We executed this from two vantage points, one of which
was local(Ariel University, Israel) and the other from
Google cloud(St. Ghislain, Belgium). Our method of time
measurement is configuration dependent, but can easily
be generalized to other cases. We analyzed each server
separately to define its time value distributions. Although
each server had its own time distribution, the Poisson
distribution was identified in each of them. We report
our analysis of both the local and the cloud environments
alongside real data from Israeli universities’ ISP [19].
• The development of a detection system for DNS poi-
soning attacks - We describe a detection system based
on observations and their interpretation. The system does
not require any changes to the protocol or any existing
network equipment. It can be used as a standalone in any
network to obtain a classification of DNS responses, and
better ensure the identification/prevention of DNS attacks.
Fig. 2. We hypothesized that the distribution of the DNS time value would
consist of a series of distributions. To simplify the presentation, we assume
they are a union of Poisson distributions. Between each two Poissons there is
a gap with no values. Therefore an attack that generates a time value located
in one of the gaps or proximal to it can be pinpointed with high probability.
• Testing the accuracy of the system based on simulation
and empirical analyses - We tested an actual cache
poisoning tool built by a third party on our system. Our
accuracy rate exceeded 98%.
• Mitigation of success rate - We compared the success rate
of the attack with and without our system. We were able
to reduce the attacker’s success rate by 70%-80%.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
discuss previous works on DNS measurement and cache
poisoning attacks in Section II. Then, we present our model
in Section III. In Section IV we describe how the method was
implemented to analyze DNS packets in a local network and
in the cloud. We differentiate between cache and non-cache
responses and use them to show ways to differentiate between
DNS levels with high accuracy. In Section V we describe
a novel poisoning attack identification method. We discuss
several learning machines we used for the methodology and
the identification of the attack in Section VI. The technical
specifications appear in Section VII and the results in Section
VIII. Section IX concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we summarize previous studies related to
DNS measurement and cache poisoning attack identification.
Van Rijswijk-Deij et al. [20] surveyed a large variety of TLD
servers. Their overview spanned features of DNS measure-
ments such as duration, goals, number of vantage points, etc.
However, their tests cases only examined cloud email services.
Ager et al. [21] evaluated the response time of ISP DNS
resolvers, GoogleDNS [22] and openDNS [23]. This study
analyzed the time value of DNS resolvers, but disregarded
DNS hierarchy levels. None of these works which analyzed
DNS server measurements, considered measuring the DNS
levels from the root down to the internal caching resolvers
or the distribution of DNS time values.
Wang et al. [24] proposed an associative feature analysis
approach based on statistical models to track the anomalous
behavior of DNS servers. In collaboration with a major com-
mercial ISP in China, they captured and analyzed real DNS
traffic in this large-scale network environment. They used an
outlier function to map malicious responses. The parameters
they used were queries/responses per client/server/specific
server. The authors detected various attacks in the real world,
but did not determine the real volume of the attacks. In other
words, they could not evaluate their accuracy.
Yamada et al. [25] focused on an anomaly detection system
for DNS servers. Normally, dealing with large number of
hosts can consume vast amounts of computational resources
and make real-time analysis difficult due to traffic overload.
They proposed anomaly detection for DNS servers that fre-
quently invoke host selection in which only potential hosts
are selected. They used a FIFO (First In First Out) based
method for frequent host selection along with other statistics.
They categorized packets by type such as DNS mail records
(MX), regular DNS packets (A), error rate, etc. They proposed
several heuristics, such as the number of queries and requests,
where a slightly higher rate of queries/requests was considered
to indicate an attack. They identified attacks such as the
spam Backscatter. This kind of spam consists of incorrectly
automated bounce messages sent by mail servers, typically as
a side effect of incoming spam (unsolicited messages). Their
attack identification system achieved 68% accuracy.
Klein et al. [26] focused on cache poisoning attacks. They
investigated a new indirect attack where they injected the
victim’s cache with a poisonous record which does not im-
mediately impact the resolution process, but rather becomes
effective after an authentic record expires. In this case, the next
resolution request to that name returns the spoofed record.
Canonical NAME record (CNAME) is a type of resource
record in the DNS used to specify that a domain name is
an alias for another domain called the ”canonical” domain.
Delegation of the NAME record (DNAME) creates an alias
for an entire subtree of the domain name tree. They injected
CNAME and DNAME responses in a cache poisoning attack.
Celik and Oktug [27] researched the Fast-Flux Service
Networks (FFSN) method used by bots. An Internet bot is
a software application that runs automated tasks (scripts) over
the Internet. Typically, bots perform tasks that are both simple
and structurally repetitive at a much higher rate than would be
possible for a human alone. Fast flux is a DNS method used by
bots to conceal their actions behind an ever-changing network
of proxies. Bots use FFSN to hide phishing and malwares
through networks of proxies and servers. The authors used
a variety of features for machine learning and achieved 98%
accuracy in FFSN identification. Some of the features were
taken from the DNS packets themselves, such as the number
of unique A records and NS records. They also mapped the
A and NS records to their geographical identifiers to better
understand their spatial entropy. They counted the AS related
to each IP and inspected the RTT values, but failed to generate
a proper analysis because of the processing and delays they
could not dissect.
An Intrusion Detection system (IDS) which is not specific to
DNS but is related to our work was implemented in Ertoz et al.
[28]. They used outliers as identifiers of anomalies to detect
attacks such as port scans, worms, etc. (no list is provided
in the article). They also explored the non-authorized use of
protocols (without inspecting the payload). The features were
divided into three parts: the package header, the time window
statistics, and the connection statistics. The anomaly detection
module was the Local Outlier Factor (LOF). The outlier factor
of a data point was local in the sense that it measured the
extent of being an outlier with respect to its nearest data points.
Each new data point distance was compared to the density of
the class data points. If its distance was smaller, it was not
considered an outlier. A pattern matching method was also
used on the top 10% suspicious connections in the previous
method to identify future attacks.
Overall, these studies used statistical methods such as out-
liers and LOF to identify attacks. Some used pattern analysis
based on prior knowledge. However, none implemented a time
stamp/time analysis as the main detection strategy. Neverthe-
less, time based analysis is easy to use, and efficient in terms
of memory and number of calculations. Recording RTT values
(along with domain names) is simple to do, which makes
this identification method easy to deploy in a large number
of systems.
III. THE MODEL
Our model consists of a client, a recursive resolver, an
attacker and a defender. The defender possesses an additional
offline dataset of DNS benign responses. Fig. 3 depicts this
model. The attacker is described in Section III-A, and the
defender in III-B.
Fig. 3. Our model is composed of the client, recursor, attacker and defender.
The defender and attacker are located inside the LAN.
A. Attacker Model
Our attacker module is an eavesdropper that can also inject
malicious packets [29]. It cannot drop a packet it sees. It can
respond with a fake packet to a query it sees. In addition, the
attacker cannot access the offline data of the defender.
Typically, the attacker in DNS poisoning attacks is an off
path attacker [30]–[32] which is considered to be a more
realistic attack model. Getting access to a LAN or attacking
on-path between a recursive resolver and authoritative name
server is much harder than spoofing response packets. The
success rate of an attacker that spoofs packets is low since
it needs to guess certain random parameters, such as the
query ID and port number. However, it can acquire these with
an additional puppet [30], or through flaws in the resolver
software design [33], etc. BGP Hijack attacks [34], [35] enable
the interception of traffic, including DNS queries. In this
frequent type of attack, the attacker who has this ability can
counterfeit DNS responses effortlessly.
Our attacker is placed inside the LAN. This defines our
attack as DNS poisoning against the client, rather than the
notorious cache poisoning attack. However, our identification
method does not need modification to enhance its ability to
detect a cache poisoning attack. The only difference is where
the attacker and defender are placed.
The attacker’s success is defined as the case where the
attacker’s response is categorized by the defender as a benign
response.
The attacker’s failure consists of sending a counter-
feit response that the defender correctly labels as an
anomaly/malicious.
B. Defender model
Our defender’s module is a sniffer. It classifies any new
sample as a benign or a malicious response. It has an offline
dataset of domain names and RTT values. It classifies the new
samples according to its dataset. We assume that it sniffs the
domain names of each response and other network parameters
such as the RTT value. We use the time value as the main
feature of this study to map the resolve levels and their time
differences. In so doing we reduce analysis time.
The defender’s success is defined as the case where the
attacker’s response is labeled as a malicious packet.
The defender’s failure is the case where the attacker’s
response is erroneously labeled as a benign packet.
IV. METHODOLOGY
This section presents the data analysis methodology. We had
two sources for the data in this study. The first was the exper-
iments we conducted. We used local and cloud environments.
Our experimental data are fully described in Section VII. We
aimed to confirm our hypothesis not only on the simulation
data but also on real data. Therefore, we acquired a second
source data from the Inter-University Computation Center
(IUCC) . The IUCC serves a vast number of faculty members
and students at Israeli universities and regional colleges as
well as researchers in numerous R&D organizations in Israel.
IUCC is considered Israeli universities’ ISP.
The data for our experiments were recorded from both a stub
resolver and a recursive resolver. We mapped each query from
the client to the correlative query that arrives at the recursive
resolver by the ID and domain parameters. A combination of
these two parameters produced a one-to-one mapping of the
client’s queries and the recursor’s responses. We did the same
for the fully resolved response from the recursive resolver to
the client. Therefore, we could have inspected the resolution
process as a whole. However, the data from the IUCC were
recorded from one link between the recursive resolver and the
authoritative name server. Some of the queries got responses
in another link. Some responses we saw were for queries that
were sent in an alternative link. Hence we could not aggregate
the resolution process. Also, we did not have any control over
which queries were asked during the record session, which
domains were asked etc. Therefore, we could not correlate the
domains from the IUCC to the domains from our experiments.
As a result, these data are mainly discussed at the Specific
Level Analysis (Section IV-D).
The first step was to separate the cache and the resolve
responses in the data to identify which response was responded
to by the recursive resolver’s memory and which ones were
either given a full or partial resolution process. This step is
important for two reasons. First, because our methodology
tends to maps time values to resolution processes, we map
the lack-of-resolution time interval. Second, separating it from
the fastest resolution process indicates a time interval where
no responses arrive. An attacker’s packet that arrives during
this time interval can thus be distinguished easily from cache
or resolved responses.
After separating the cache and resolve levels, we broke
down the DNS resolve levels. The DNS level of a query
sent to the recursive resolver is the highest level in the DNS
hierarchy to which any of the resolution queries were sent by
the resolver. For example, if a query about www.wikipedia.org
was sent to the recursive resolver (as in Fig. 4), and it sent a
resolution query to the root server (which is the highest level
in the hierarchy), the query was tagged as root level.
Fig. 4. DNS resolve levels for www.wikipedia.org. The resolving process
is done by the DNS recurser (recursive resolver) on www.wikipedia.org.
The resolution takes place in steps 1-3 by the root, org. and wikipedia.org.
nameservers.
Then, we analyzed each DNS level separately to better
understand the RTT distribution. We inspected each domain
by separating the data into domains. This provided a clearer
view of the distribution of each domain. Each domain was
inspected in terms of the DNS levels, and yielded a probability
table for each domain and the specific time intervals in each.
We analyzed the data in four steps:
1) Cache or Resolve analysis: This analysis identified
which response was from the cache and which one had
received a full/partial resolution process.
2) Hierarchy Levels Analysis: This analysis separated the
DNS resolve levels over the entire dataset.
3) Specific Level Analysis: This analysis focused on the
distribution of each DNS level.
4) Specific Domain Inspection: This analysis grouped the
data into domains to get a clearer view.
As mentioned in Section III, our attacker attacks a client.
This analysis allowed us to determine from the client’s point
of view how the data distributed for each DNS level. From
the client’s point of view, every response is received from
the same IP - the recursive resolver’s IP. Therefore, we need
to distinguish between DNS levels. Note that in a cache
poisoning attack, there is no need for our methodology. In
this case, the data for each DNS level are separate, since the
recursive resolver sees the IPs and can track each DNS level
separately. Therefore, this section is not relevant for a cache
poisoning attack. However, Section V can be used both for
our attack and for cache poisoning attack.
A. Cache or Resolve analysis
First, the cached responses were separated from the re-
solved responses. We assumed this would be feasible since
the resolve process takes time. We found that there was a
considerable difference between the cached responses and the
resolved responses as a function of the components and the
communication system. Fig. 5 depicts these differences, where
the cached responses are on the far left side and the resolved
responses are on the right side. A gap of ∼50 ms appears
between them.
The cached responses were identified by the fact that the
query from the client and the response from the recursive
resolver were successive. As a further confirmation method,
we tested the ping between the client and the recursive
resolver, and compared the average value of the ping to the
actual response values. The response RTT values that were
close to the average ping value were from the cache.
Fig. 5 depicts the distribution of the RTT values between
0-96 ms. acquired from one of our experiments. The figure
shows that there was a wide gap between the cache on the
left side (blue) of the histogram, and the beginning of resolve
responses on the right side (green) of the histogram.
This analysis led us to the conclusion that the cached
responses could be easily identified. The next step was to
determine whether we could identify each level of the DNS
hierarchy.
B. Hierarchy Levels Analysis
We inspected the behavior of the DNS levels. Each reso-
lution query from the recursive resolver was inspected indi-
vidually, which yielded detailed data about the client’s query
it was connected to. By identifying the source’s IP from the
response, it was possible to identify the current level of resolve
of the resolve query. Each response’s source IP was identified
Fig. 5. Classification of recursive resolver responses, between 0-100 ms,
at 1 ms intervals. The estimated ping value is 2 ms, because the recursive
resolver in this experiment was in the same LAN of the client. Most of the
smooth responses (cache) were lower than the ping value. All the hatched
circle responses were higher.
in a reverse DNS query to get its DNS level. We mapped
each client’s query to the highest DNS level of any resolution
query that was done for it. It was impossible to extract the
DNS levels’ distributions from the data as a whole since most
of the intervals were mixed with a number of DNS levels. We
had to devise another way to approach the problem.
As a result, our next step was to separate the levels and
inspect them individually. In each level, we took the relevant
authoritative servers and verified the RTT values based on the
responses acquired from them.
C. Specific Level analysis
For this analysis, we examined both our data sources. We
separated out each resolve query to map each DNS level.
We generated histograms for each authoritative server at the
specific level included in our data to fully examine their RTT
distribution. These histograms can vary from different vantage
points. To test whether our hypothesis on the RTT distribution
would hold with respect to each vantage point, we ran our
experiment from two vantage points. The third vantage point
was the IUCC.
First, we looked at the behavior of the root level. We
created histograms for the 13 root servers [36], as depicted
in Fig. 6(a-c). Except for root server j in the local experiment,
most of the responses arrived within an interval of 40-80 ms,
with differences of 40 ms between them. Root server j was
inspected separately and was found to be much closer to the
recursive resolver than the other root servers. The average ping
value of root server j was ∼ 12 ms, whereas the minimal
ping value of other root servers was ∼ 80ms. In addition,
a traceroute check showed that it was the only root server
whose route included IIX ISP, which was located near our
local experiment site. These features confirmed that root server
j was the most efficient root server for the local experiment.
Second, we examined the behavior of the TLD level to
determine the differences between the behavior of the gen-
eral TLD (gTLD) level servers, and the country code TLD
(ccTLD). The country code TLDs are reserved for a specific
country or state. We separated the country code TLDs from
the other TLDs to determine whether there was a difference in
their response times. We generated histograms for both types
of TLD servers as shown in Fig. 6(d-i).
Because there were too many gTLD servers to depict in one
histogram, we chose one of the most frequently used gTLD
server types (from a.gtld-servers.net to m.gtld-servers.net) that
is representative of .com and .net domains. As depicted in Fig.
6, the histograms were similar to the root servers, especially
in terms of the mean and the distribution of the RTT values.
Similar to the root servers, there was one server in the
local data experiment that was different. The b.gtld-servers.net
ping value was ∼ 15ms, whereas the other gTLD server’s
ping value was at least ∼ 80ms. Furthermore, the traceroute
command showed a similar result as for root server j.
Country code TLDs are scattered over the globe. Therefore,
their RTT values depends on the country and the distance from
the recursive resolver. We took 6 countries as an example,
and created three histograms for every vantage point. The
histograms are depicted in Fig. 6(g-i). Clearly, the ccTLDs
RTT values were different across countries and the distribution
within each nation was different. Most of China’s RTT values
were located between 50-90 in the local experiment and IUCC,
whereas Russia’s was 120-160 ms in the local experiment, and
80-120 ms. in IUCC.
The results showed that every level had its own RTT distri-
bution. The synthetic data we obtained from our experiments
showed similarities to the actual data from the IUCC in Fig.
6(c) and 6(f), with small shifts between them. Thus, the
distribution of the synthetic data proved to be equivalent to
the real data. The distributions of the root and the gtld servers
were similar to a Poisson distribution, whereas the ccTLDs
were diverse (due to geographical distances).
We next tested our predictions on domains, to make the
attack identification more precise. By separating into domains
we expected to find more gaps in the RTT distribution. We
also tested each part of the Poisson distribution. Thus, in the
next stage we separated the data into domains.
D. Specific domain inspection
The data in this inspection were separated by domain.
We inspected the top 500 domains from alexa.com. Each
domain was inspected individually, resulting in ∼ 500 smaller
distributions.
The value measured at each level was also taken into ac-
count at the next level as a result of the recursive process. For
example, a TLD’s RTT value was assigned for its resolution
query, and was summed with the root RTT value to create the
accumulated RTT value of the root level. The process time
between the query for the TLD and the root was summed
as well, to obtain the actual RTT value. Each domain was
inspected in two ways:
1) Level: Each DNS level was clustered in a different set.
2) Probabilistic: This inspection mapped the common use
of the recursive resolver. This inspection was divided
into two parts: domain and interval.
a) Domain: For each domain, the data were grouped
by DNS level, to obtain a percentile division. For
example for the domain quora.com, we obtained
a cache of 98.8713%, a TLD of 0.2257%, and a
SLD of 0.9029%.
b) Interval: This inspection was specific to a time
interval. For example, for the time interval of 60-
70 ms of abc.com, there were 100 responses out
of a total of 50,000 for the domain, with the
following distribution: Root - 10 responses, TLD
- 40 responses, SLD - 100 responses. In other
words, the probability of obtaining responses in
this interval was 0.3%. The following probabilities
corresponded to the number of responses by each
level in this time interval: Root - 6.66%, TLD -
26.66%, SLD - 66%.
The RTT distribution of 3 of the top sites is depicted as
an example in Fig. 7(a-c). The figures represent sites from
the local experiment between 0-400 ms, at 10 ms intervals.
The histograms resemble Poissons with regard to each site
separately. Fig. 7(d-f) depicts the same sites with identification
of each resolve level. Each Poisson is dominated by a different
color, which means a different resolve level. This correlation
confirms the hypothesis with regard to each domain. The gaps
that can be seen between the Poissons are the baseline for our
attack identification method.
V. IDENTIFICATION OF AN ATTACK
As stated above, we used our methodology to generate
distributions of the data. These distributions were then used
to identify DNS poisoning attacks. In following section, we
discuss the identification method which is identical for both
DNS poisoning and DNS cache poisoning except for the place
of the attacker and the defender. In our model associated
with DNS poisoning, both the attacker and defender reside
in the LAN. In cache poisoning attack, the attacker is placed
somewhere in the internet. The defender is located beside the
resolver.
In Sections V and VI, we used the domain Yahoo.com as an
example since Yahoo.com is one of the top 5 most searched
domains in alexa.com. Based on the distribution of our data,
we tried to evaluate our hypothesis on attack identification.
We used a heuristic function to obtain clear insights into the
distribution of the data. Then, we used a DNS attack tool to
generate attack packets. Notations appear in Table I.
(a) Root servers distributions from the local exper-
iment.
(b) Root servers distributions from the cloud exper-
iment.
(c) Root servers distributions from the IUCC data
source.
(d) gTLD servers distributions from the local ex-
periment.
(e) gTLD servers distributions from the cloud ex-
periment.
(f) gTLD servers distributions from the IUCC data
source.
(g) ccTLD servers distributions from the local ex-
periment.
(h) ccTLD servers distributions from the cloud
experiment.
(i) ccTLD servers distributions from the IUCC data
source.
Fig. 6. Local and cloud experiments had no any data from root server b. IUCC did not include any data from root server j or gTLD server b. The majority
of RTT values from the root servers were between 80-160 ms in the local experiment. In the cloud experiment, the majority were between 0-40 ms. Most of
the responses from root servers arrived between 40-80 ms in the IUCC data source. As for the gTLD servers, the majority of the RTT values in the local data
experiment were between 80-120 ms. (except from server b). In the cloud data experiment, the majority was between 0-40 ms. Most of the responses from
gTLD servers arrived between 40-80 ms in the IUCC data source. We picked 6 countries for the ccTLD servers: China, France, Mexico, Russia, Taiwan, and
the UK. Each country had a unique distribution. China was the most heterogeneous.
(a) Youtube.com distribution (b) Facebook.com distribution (c) Baidu.com distribution
(d) Youtube.com resolve levels (e) Facebook.com resolve levels (f) Baidu.com resolve levels
Fig. 7. Distribution of RTT values for the top 3 sites, in the local experiment. Each histogram is depicted at 10 ms intervals, between 0-400 ms. We addressed
bins with fewer than 30 responses (out of a total of ∼ 1500 packets for each domain) as noise. Sub figures (a-c) support the assumption (see Fig. 2) that
a proper description of the RTT value distribution is a collection of distributions with gaps between them. Sub figures (d-f) depict each DNS resolve level.
They confirms the hypothesis of a correlation between the Poissons and the resolve levels.
TABLE I
LIST OF SYMBOLS
N Total number of packets (for the domain).
t Specific time interval t.
nt Number of responses from the resolver in interval t.
α Amount of data in a specific bin out of the entire data.
H(n) Heuristic function implied on n.
B Binary vector describing the impact of H(n) on our data
bins.
Bi I’th bit of B.
A. Measurements
To assess the effectiveness of the attack, we assumed that
whenever a query is sent to the recursive resolver, a single
attack response is sent in parallel to the response from the
recursor. The attacker’s goal is to answer any query it sees
as fast as it can. Therefore, it produces single packet for a
query and proceeds to the next query. There were no duplicate
responses or response failures. Each response had a race
condition: attack response vs. the recursive resolver’s response.
We describe a number of measurements, and then present our
theoretical method to test our attack mitigation rate
.
1) Probability of RTT value: Pr(rtt = t) represents the
probability of getting a specific RTT value t. We denote
by nt the number of packets in a specific interval. N
represents the total number of packets for the specific
domain. We used the formula:
Pr(rtt = t) =
nt
N
(1)
An example of this probability distribution is presented
in Fig. 8. It depicts the probability to getting an RTT
value in intervals of 10 ms. It can be seen that the
probability of obtaining a response in 0-10 ms. is above
50%. The probability of obtaining a response between
60-70 ms. is 8%. Each domain was described by this
kind of histogram.
Fig. 8. An example of a probability distribution: Yahoo.com which is one of
the top 5 domains from alexa.com, at 10 ms intervals. More than 50% of the
values are from the cache in the first bin between 0-10 ms. The remaining
values are centered around 70-90 ms, and 130-200 ms.
2) Probability of attack success: As mentioned in Section
III, we used an eavesdropper attack that can inject
counterfeit packets. To simplify our calculations, we
assumed that the attack can fake response to any query it
sees. Therefore, the attack success’ probability is 100%.
Thus, a change in the number of packets the attack sends
does not alter its success rate.
3) Heuristic function: To document the success rate of
the attack with and without our system, we took the
percentile distribution from Section V-A(1). Our purpose
was to remove negligible amounts of RTT values to
obtain a clearer picture of each domain. Thus, we
mapped each bin with the function H(n), where α is
the percentage of the data in the specific bin.
H(n) =
{
1, if α > threshold
0, elsewhere.
4) New attack success rate: Applying H(n) on our data
produced a 1D binary vector. We denote it as B. Its
length is 100 since every bin describes 10 ms. for
an interval of 0-1000 ms. This is the interval we got
responses in. We summed all the intervals, and averaged
the success on the complete interval by dividing the
Fig. 9. Success rate of an attack as a function in alpha values in our data of
two experiments (which are fully described in Section VII). We used alpha
values between 0-8%. Each alpha value produced a different attack success
rate. The identification is based on the bins where there were data exceeding
the current alpha value. For example, α = 0.5 produced a 29% success rate
for the attack in the Local exp., and 19% for the Google exp.
sum by 100. Therefore, the attack success rate with our
system is:
Pr[attack
′s success] = 0.01 ∗
100∑
i=1
H(n) ∗Bi (2)
We tried multiple alpha values between 0%-8%. Fig. 9 depicts
the influence of the alpha values on the attack’s success rate in
our system. A higher alpha value results in a higher mitigation
rate/lower attack’s success rate. However, a higher alpha value
increases the false positive (FP) rate where many benign
packets are falsely indicated as attacks. An extreme case is
α = 100% which erases all the data, and marks every packet
as an attack. In this case, the false negative (FN) rate is 0%
but the FP is 100%. For a α value exceeding 0.5 the attack’s
success rate drops by 70%-80%.
B. Experimental attack
We also tested an experimental attack. This attack was
created by our DNS poisoning tool [37]. It was executed as
an inside-the-LAN attack between the client and the recursive
resolver. The distribution of the attack was between 0-20
ms, since we designed it to outrun the recursor and its
cached memory responses. Because there was a considerable
difference between the RTT values of the attack responses and
the responses from the resolution process, we only used the
Fig. 10. Attack and cache distribution from the local environment, between
0-20 ms at 0.5 ms intervals. The intersection of the attack and the cache
responses is in the second and third bins. Thus tagging these bins as cache
produces a 0.66% error rate.
responses tagged as cache as benign data for our identification
method.
We first tested the intuitive notion of a threshold for the
cache by generating histograms of the data from our exper-
iment(Fig. 10 for local environment and Fig. 11 for cloud
environment).
Intuitively the bins where the cache and attack responses
intersect, and where the cache constitutes the majority of each
bin should be tagged as cache. The intersection of the cache
and the attack responses were in the second and third bins
in the local environment, and in the first and second bins in
the cloud environment. In the local environment, the intuitive
process yielded a 0.66% error rate. In the cloud, it yielded a
1.4% error rate. The results are presented in section VIII-B.
VI. MACHINE LEARNING
Our methodology and attack identification in Sections IV
and V consisted of classifying packets into two or more
classes. This made it possible to implement learning machines.
A successful classifying rate between intervals in any domain
depends on the information acquired about that specific do-
main.
In an interval where there were high values of diverse DNS
levels, the classifying rate was lower. In an interval where there
were a high number of benign responses, the identification
rate of the attack was lower. The gaps with no responses at
all corresponded to places where the identification rate of the
attack was high.
Fig. 11. Attack and cache distribution from the cloud environment, between
0-20 ms at 0.5 ms intervals. The intersection of the attack and the cache
responses is in the first and second bins. Thus tagging these bins as cache
produces a 1.4% error rate.
Supervised learning [38], [39] involves creating a function
from labeled training data. This is done by using training data
that consists of a set of training examples. Each train example
pairs an input object and an output value. A supervised
learning algorithm analyzes the training data and produces a
function which can be used for mapping new samples into
corresponding output values.
Random Forest [40], [41] consists of an ensemble of k
untrained Decision Trees (trees with only a root node). The
following steps are carried out on these roots: at the current
node, randomly select p features from available features. The
number of features p is usually much smaller than the total
number of features. Then compute the best split point for tree
k and split the current node into two sons. Reduce the number
of total features from this node on. Repeat the previous steps
until either a maximum tree of depth l has been reached or the
splitting metric reaches some extremum. Repeat all the above
for each tree k in the forest. Aggregate on the output of each
tree in the forest.
KNN classification algorithm [42]–[44] is used to classify
a test sample according to its K training samples that are the
nearest to it. Each train sample has a label. The algorithm
takes the label of the majority of the K nearest samples and
assigns it to the test sample.
We chose these methods since random forest may find a set
of simple rules that will accommodate the data distribution and
K nearest neighbors is an algorithm that finds outliers from a
main distribution. It turned out to be more stable than other
anomaly detection algorithms we tried.
We used these learning methods to obtain the best identifi-
cation rate. As a ground rule for these learning machines, we
used a ratio of 80/20 between the training and test samples.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the technical specifications of the
data collection for Sections IV and V. We ran experiments in
two environments: local and in the cloud. The cloud provider
we used was Google’s cloud engine. We used local machines
for the lab experiment and VMs for the cloud experiment. We
used a network bandwidth of 100Mb. Both experiments were
run in ∼ 4-7 days. We took the top 500 sites from alexa.com
as a sample to simulate user access to different sites.
The software we used to imitate a DNS recursive resolver
was BIND [45]. We used tshark [46] software to log the
communication both in the client and the resolver. We ana-
lyzed the domain, RTT value, query/response flag, ip src/dst,
and the answer itself. The identifying process was based on
an IANA TLD database [47]. For specific level inspection,
we also used a DNS tool for Python called dnspython [48],
and nslookup software [49], by querying the dns tool and
performing a nslookup query if the former failed. We used
a dns-cache-poisoning tool [37] as the attack software. This
is a simple open source tool which we customized easily to
our experiment. We added a randomized sleep to the attack
to randomize its RTT values. The attack was detected by a
Python sickit implementation of machine learning [50]. Our
data are available in a Google drive [51].
(a) Exp. 1
(b) Exp. 2
Fig. 12. In Exp. 1 a client queries a recursive resolver, and the communication
is recorded in log files(log 1 and log 2). In Exp. 2 the attacker spoofs responses
to the client.
The experiments are depicted in Fig. 12; experiment 1, is
shown in Fig. 12(a). The experiment involved recording benign
DNS packets between a stub resolver and a recursive resolver.
Each query or response within the LAN between the client and
the recursor was recorded by a log file(log 1). Each resolve
query/response that was taken by the recursive resolver outside
the LAN was recorded by another log file(log 2). We correlated
the two log files by domain+ID parameters to determine the
DNS level from which client received a response.
This way, the stub resolver’s RTT value was mapped onto
a DNS level produced outside of the LAN/recursive resolver’s
log file. We needed to produce the recursor’s responses from
the cache and the resolution process. This was made possible
by changing the TTL value in the recursive resolver. To get
cache responses, we changed the TTL value to ∼ 3 hours.
To collect more resolution responses, we changed the TTL
value to 0. This way, we mapped the behavior of the recursive
resolver in both cases.
Experiment 2, depicted in Fig. 12(b), involved an attacker
between the client and the resolver. Each experiment produced
about ∼ 0.5m response packets.
We obtained real data from IUCC [19]. These data were
acquired from a line between Tel Aviv and Frankfurt and were
recorded over about ∼2 days. Congestion on this link caused
packet drop. In addition, uneven routing caused some of the
responses to be delivered in another link. Thus, some of the
queries were unanswered. Overall, we only used about ∼25%
of the packets, or approx. 1.3 million. We assumed that these
data did not contain attempts at cache poisoning. As stated in
Section IV, we only analyzed the IUCC data in Section IV-D.
Therefore, we analyzed the IP sources and not domains from
each packet.
To control for data reliability, we split the data from each
data source into a ratio of 80/20 of train/test. We assessed
whether the test data distributed in a similar way as the
train data. We found that the distributions were similar. In
the IUCC data there was less than a 5% differentiation for
each time interval between the train and test data. In the data
from our experiments, most of the data had less than a 5%
differentiation in each time interval between the train and test
data. Less than 10% of the domains had 1-3 intervals which
had ∼5%-10% differentiation between the train and test data.
VIII. RESULTS
In the following section, we describe the results of Sections
IV and V from the learning machines described in Section VI.
A list of abbreviations is presented in Table II.
TABLE II
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS FOR RESULT TABLES
Acc Accuracy
Dev Deviation
Var Variance
RF Random Forest
KNN K Nearest Neighbors
Att Attack’s identification rate
FP False Positives
FN False Negatives
L Local experiment
C Cloud experiment
sub subdomain
A. Methodology
As presented in Section IV, we separated the data into
specific domains, creating ∼ 500 sub-datasets. We added the
deviation and variance for each indicator. We used Random
Forest (RF) and K Nearest Neighbors (KNN) to identify the
origin of the responses, as stated in Section VI. The average
proportion of the cache/DNS level of resolve in each data is
presented in Table III.
TABLE III
PROPORTION OF PACKETS IN THE DATA
Cache Root gTLD ccTLD sub host
L 41.651 23.257 13.432 1.644 19.87 0.13
C 16.76 32.88 19.38 2.872 28.072 0.07
Tables IV and V present the cache and non-cache identi-
fication. This calculation was straightforward as was shown
in Section IV-A since the RTT values were quite different
between the cache and the resolve levels. We achieved an
accuracy rate of 98%. This was done to better identify the
distribution of the DNS packets, and to test our ability to
distinguish between the DNS levels.
Tables VI and VII indicate the identification rates of the
DNS hierarchy levels, as stated in Section IV-D. We analyzed
the DNS level and the cache data. We obtained a correct
identification rate of approximately 75% in the cloud, and
∼84% in the local data. This analysis proved to be more
difficult, because each domain depicts a slightly different
histogram. Some created a dense distribution, with a number
of different DNS levels in the center which made it hard to
differentiate between levels. Furthermore, due to the cloud’s
resources, the RTT value was small in most of the responses.
Therefore, dissecting levels in its data was less successful.
TABLE IV
CACHE/NO CACHE DIFFERENTIATION IN THE CLOUD ENVIRONMENT.
Acc Dev Var
RF 0.983 0.02 5*10−4
KNN 0.985 0.02 4*10−4
TABLE V
CACHE/NO CACHE DIFFERENTIATION IN THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT.
Acc Dev Var
RF 0.983 0.02 5*10−4
KNN 0.985 0.02 5*10−4
TABLE VI
IDENTIFYING DNS LEVELS INCLUDING CACHE IN THE CLOUD
ENVIRONMENT.
Acc Dev Var
RF 0.75 0.1 0.01
KNN 0.69 0.1 0.01
TABLE VII
IDENTIFYING DNS LEVELS INCLUDING CACHE IN THE LOCAL
ENVIRONMENT.
Acc Dev Var
RF 0.81 0.06 0.004
KNN 0.84 0.06 0.003
TABLE VIII
IDENTIFYING DNS LEVELS WITHOUT CACHE IN THE CLOUD
ENVIRONMENT.
Acc Dev Var
RF 0.64 0.1 0.01
KNN 0.7 0.1 0.01
TABLE IX
IDENTIFYING DNS LEVELS WITHOUT CACHE IN THE LOCAL
ENVIRONMENT.
Acc Dev Var
RF 0.71 0.08 0.007
KNN 0.76 0.08 0.007
Tables VIII and IX show the identification rate of the DNS
hierarchy levels, from the root level excluding the cache data.
We obtained a correct identification rate in the cloud of about
70%, and ∼76% in the local data. Tables VI and VII include
the cache data, which are more distinguishable. Therefore, the
identification rate is different in this case.
As can be seen in the tables, the identification rate in
almost every stage was slightly different between the envi-
ronments. This can be attributed to disparities in Google’s
resources. Each packet goes through a smaller number of
hops in the resolution process in the cloud than in the local
resolver. Google has considerably shorter routes to most of the
root/gTLD/ccTLD servers, which gives it a low RTT value for
most requests. Thus, it is more difficult to separate the levels
in the data from Google.
B. Empirical attack
We ran an experimental attack, as mentioned in Section V-B.
The attack packets were received between 0-20 ms, so that they
arrived before the cache responses. An eavesdrop/inject attack
between the stub resolver and the recursive resolver was used
to generate these attack packets. Since the attack was located
inside the LAN, as indicated in Section III, the attack packets
arrived fast. We used its data along with the data from section
VIII-A. The results are presented in Tables X and XI.
TABLE X
EXPERIMENTAL ATTACK IDENTIFICATION RATE FROM THE CLOUD
ENVIRONMENT. THE DEVIATION IN ALL THE CASES WAS BELOW 4%.
Acc FP FN
RF 0.987 0.005 0.006
KNN 0.990 0.003 0.006
TABLE XI
EXPERIMENTAL ATTACK IDENTIFICATION RATE FROM THE LOCAL
ENVIRONMENT. THE DEVIATION IN ALL THE CASES WAS BELOW 1%.
Acc FP FN
RF 0.997 0.001 0.001
KNN 0.998 0.001 0.0006
As can be seen in Tables X and XI, we had ∼ 99% correct
identification rate. As mentioned in Section VII, we generated
∼ 0.5m attack packets. To be precise, we identified 355,606
out of 359,197 attack packets from the Google data, and
131,415 out of 131,810 from our local simulation data. We
assumed that although the identification rate for the empirical
attack was superior to the naive calculation, the difference
was not pronounced since each learning machine had only
one feature. Thus, the machine’s power was comparable to
the naive threshold. Our identification rate was found to be
superior to the naive threshold by 0.2%-0.4%.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented an innovative method to detect
DNS poisoning attacks. We assumed that the behavior of
the RTT value could be generalized as a number of Poisson
distributions. Each Poisson addresses a resolve level. Thus,
analyzing the gaps between the Poissons can serve to detect
attacks. We confirmed our hypothesis in various environments,
and used it as a basis for identification of the attack.
This study presented our method for an experimental local
network attack. In the future, we aim to apply this identifica-
tion method to other kinds of attacks. For example, it could
be used to identify cache poisoning attacks against recursive
resolvers. To do so, each level will be inspected separately
to detect anomalies from the recursor’s point of view. This
appears to be easier, since no classifying process is needed,
given the lack of intersecting levels. The time analysis may
be more precise, since the distribution of only one DNS level
is more distinguishable.
Future work will also concentrate on the precision of the
analysis. In this paper, we analyzed the data at milliseconds
intervals. We saw that this process failed to fit Google. In the
future, we will attempt to analyze the data at microseconds
intervals to achieve higher accuracy, while determining the
level of precision that results in a fit and avoids overfitting.
Adding packet drops, multiple responses and other kinds of
failures may change our model. These cases are intriguing
topics for further investigations and may make the results
reported here more resilient. These models may lead to a
prototype for a more realistic defense system.
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